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**Report of the Human Rights Council**

**Programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007**

# Revised estimates resulting from resolutions and decisions adopted by the Human Rights Council at its first session and its first and second special sessions in 2006

## Report of the Secretary-General

*Summary*

The present report details budgetary requirements resulting from resolutions, decisions and President's statements adopted by the Human Rights Council at its first session and its first and second special sessions in 2006. The expenditure requirements arising as a result of those resolutions and decisions are estimated at $6,033,300. Of this amount, provisions for $4,328,600 have already been made in the budget for the biennium 2006-2007. It is anticipated that the balance of $1,704,700 can be absorbed within the resources already provided for in the biennium 2006-2007. In addition, the requirements for the biennium 2008-2009 estimated at $2,639,300 will be considered in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009.

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# I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted to inform the General Assembly of the requirements resulting from resolutions and decisions adopted by the Human Rights Council at its first session and its first and second special sessions in 2006.[1]

2. The Council adopted a number of resolutions and decisions in which it authorized relevant human rights bodies and special procedures to continue or undertake additional activities, including meetings, in excess of the resources approved in the 2006-2007 programme budget and which would impact the estimates of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009. In certain instances provisions have been made in the 2006-2007 programme budget for some of the activities. In accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the Council was provided, where appropriate, with a statement of programme budget implications prior to the adoption of the resolutions and decisions. The additional requirements associated with the Council's resolutions and decisions are described below.

3. Regarding additional conference-servicing requirements, in each relevant case the Council was informed of the full cost of the additional services to be provided and any potential for absorption of the requirements within the approved appropriations, as applicable. On that basis, it was indicated to the Council that the required resources would be accommodated within the resources available for the biennium 2006-2007 under section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management, and under section 28E, Administration, Geneva, of the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007.

# II. Additional requirements relating to resolutions and decisions adopted by the Human Rights Council

## A. Resolution 1/1: International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance

4. Under the terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1/1, the Human Rights Council:

(a) Adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, as annexed to the resolution;

(b) Recommended to the General Assembly adoption of the Convention.

5. In paragraph 1, article 26, of the annex to the resolution it is stated that a Committee on Enforced Disappearances would be established to carry out the functions provided for in the Convention. It is also stated that the Committee would consist of 10 experts of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights, who would serve in their personal capacity and be independent and impartial.

6. As stipulated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 26, members of the Committee would be elected by the States parties to the Convention, and the initial election of members of the Committee would be held no later than six months after the date of entry into force of the Convention.

7. Paragraph 7 of article 26 states that the Secretary-General of the United Nations would provide the necessary means, staff and facilities for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee. Under paragraph 1 of article 39, the terms provide that the Convention would enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit with the Secretary-General of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession. Subject to the priority that Member States give to the speedy entry into force of the Convention, it is possible to envisage that the entry into force may take place during the biennium 2008-2009.

8. The adoption by the Human Rights Council at its first session, and the possible adoption by the General Assembly at its sixty-first session, of the Convention is not expected to give rise to programme budget implications for the biennium 2006-2007. Were the Convention to enter into force during the biennium 2008-2009, total net estimated biennial requirements of $1,880,600 would be as follows:

| | *United States dollars* |
|---|---|
| Section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management | 1 024 000 |
| Section 23, Human rights | 846 700 |
| Section 28E, Administration, Geneva | 9 900 |
| Section 35, Staff assessment | 74 600 |
| Income section 1, Income from staff assessment | (74 600) |
| **Total** | **1 880 600** |

9. The estimate is based on the assumption that the Committee would hold its first organizational meeting in 2008 and that it would hold two sessions in 2009. Other assumptions that guide the estimates include possible decisions of the Committee to plan visits to two States parties in 2009, in accordance with article 33 of the Convention. It is also assumed (on the basis of the experience of the visits carried out by other Committees) that each visit would be at least of two weeks duration, and that it would be carried out by three Committee members accompanied by four staff members and interpreters. The minimum Secretariat support needed to provide substantive services to the Committee during the biennium would consist of 1 P-4, 1 P-3 and 1 General Service (Other level) posts.

10. Should the terms of paragraph 1 of article 39 be met, it is proposed that the requirements estimated in the table of paragraph 8 above be considered in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009.

11. Accordingly, no additional appropriation for the biennium 2006-2007 would be required.

## B. Resolution 1/3: Open-ended Working Group on an optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

12. Under the terms of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of resolution 1/3, the Human Rights Council:

(a) Decided to extend the mandate of the Working Group for a period of two years in order to elaborate an optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and in this regard requested the Chairperson of the Working Group to prepare, taking into account all views expressed during the sessions of the Working Group, a first draft optional protocol to be used as a basis for the forthcoming negotiations;

(b) Requested the Working Group to meet for 10 working days each year and to report to the Human Rights Council;

(c) Decided to invite a representative of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to attend the meetings as a resource person.

13. It is estimated that the two 10-day sessions of the Working Group would require provisions for travel and daily subsistence allowance of representatives and conference servicing, at full costs, in the biennium 2006-2007 as follows:

| | *United States dollars* |
|---|---|
| Section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management | 794 400 |
| Section 23, Human rights | 23 200 |
| Section 28E, Administration, Geneva | 13 200 |
| **Total** | **830 800** |

14. Resources related to the extension of the mandate and the meetings of the Working Group called for under paragraphs 2 and 3 have been included under section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management and section 28E, Administration, Geneva, of the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007. Therefore adoption of the resolution does not entail additional conference servicing requirements.

15. With regard to paragraphs 3 and 4, the activities envisaged thereunder would require provisions for travel and daily subsistence allowance for the chairperson of the Working Group and for the representative of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Total costs of such requirements would amount to $23,200 under section 23, Human rights, in the biennium 2006-2007. The related costs for the travel and daily subsistence allowance would be absorbed within overall resources approved for section 23, Human rights, under the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007.

## C. Resolution 1/4: The right to development

16. Under the terms of paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 of resolution 1/4, the Human Rights Council:

(a) Decided to renew the mandate of the Working Group on the Right to Development for a period of one year;

(b) Requested the high-level task force on the implementation of the right to development to meet for a period of five working days before the end of 2006 with a view to implementing the relevant recommendations contained in the report on the seventh session of the Working Group on the Right to Development;

(c) Requested the Working Group on the Right to Development to meet for a period of five working days in the first three months of 2007;

(d) Requested the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to take all necessary measures and to allocate the necessary resources for the effective implementation of the resolution;

(e) Decided to consider the next report of the Working Group on the Right to Development at its session in March/April 2007.

17. The adoption of the resolution by the Human Rights Council and its expected adoption by the General Assembly gives rise to total estimated requirements of $478,000 for the biennium 2006-2007, as follows: under section 2 for conference services, $360,600; under section 23 for travel and daily subsistence allowance, $110,800; and under section 28E for conference services, $6,600.

18. Resources for conference services and the Working Group's travel cost have been included under sections 2, 23 and 28E of the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007 for the Working Group to meet for a period of five working days per year. Since the combined duration of the meeting of the task force and the session of the Working Group is for 10 days, no additional appropriation is required in response to the resolution. Were the Working Group to meet for additional periods, additional travel requirements might arise under section 23, Human rights. The Secretariat would to the extent possible absorb within existing resources the requirements of the Working Group.

## D. Resolution 1/5: Intergovernmental Working Group on the effective implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action

19. Under the terms of paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of resolution 1/5, the Human Rights Council:

(a) Requested OHCHR to select, in close consultation with regional groups, five highly qualified experts to study the content and scope of the substantive gaps in the existing international instruments to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. The group of experts, in consultation with human rights treaty bodies, the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and other relevant mandate holders, should produce a base document that contains concrete

recommendations on the means or avenues to bridge these gaps, including but not limited to the drafting of a new optional protocol to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination or the adoption of new instruments such as conventions or declarations;

(b) Requested the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to conduct a further study on possible measures to strengthen the implementation of the Convention through additional recommendations or the update of its monitoring procedures;

(c) Decided that both documents should be presented to the Working Group at its fifth session;

(d) Decided also to extend the mandate of the Working Group for a further period of three years.

20. Should the resolution be adopted by the General Assembly, it is estimated that requirements of $579,800 would arise under the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007 as follows: under section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management, $372,700; under section 23, Human rights, $200,500 for travel and daily subsistence allowance for five experts and general temporary assistance for six months; and under section 28E, Administration, Geneva, $6,600. Requirements of $758,700 are also expected to arise for conference services in the biennium 2008-2009.

21. Resources for conference servicing costs related to the extension of the mandate of the Working Group have been included under sections 2 and 28E of the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007. Therefore no additional appropriation is required.

22. Provision of $200,500 has however not been made under section 23, Human rights, of the 2006-2007 programme budget to cover the travel and daily subsistence allowance for five experts and general temporary assistance for six months. It is estimated that these requirements can be accommodated within existing resources under section 23, Human rights, of the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007.

23. Regarding the requirements of $758,700 for the biennium 2008-2009, it is proposed to consider such requirements in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009.

## E. Resolution S-1/1: Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

24. Under paragraph 6 of resolution S-1/1, the Council decided to dispatch an urgent fact-finding mission, headed by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, to the occupied Palestinian territories.

25. The activities envisaged under paragraph 6 of the resolution consist of:

(a) One mission of a Special Rapporteur to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, accompanied by four staff members and two Security Officers to support the mission;

(b) Submission of the report of the High Commissioner to the Council.

26. The estimated costs of the activities for the year 2006 under section 23, Human rights, amount to $27,300.

27. No provisions have been made under the 2006-2007 programme budget for the above activities. It is anticipated, however, that the related travel costs could be absorbed within overall resources included in the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007 under section 23, Human rights.

## F. Resolution S-2/1: The grave situation of human rights in Lebanon caused by Israeli military operations

28. Under the terms of paragraphs 7, 8 and 10 of resolution S-2/1, the Human Rights Council:

(a) Decided to establish urgently and immediately dispatch a high-level commission of inquiry comprising eminent experts on human rights law and international humanitarian law and including the possibility of inviting the relevant United Nations special procedures to be nominated to the Commission:

(i) To investigate the systematic targeting and killings of civilians by Israel in Lebanon;

(ii) To examine the types of weapons used by Israel and their conformity with international law;

(iii) To assess the extent and deadly impact of Israeli attacks on human life, property, critical infrastructure and the environment;

(b) Requested the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to provide all administrative, technical and logistical assistance required to enable the Commission of Inquiry to fulfil its mandate promptly and efficiently;

(c) Requested the Commission of Inquiry to report to the Council no later than 1 September 2006 on progress made towards the fulfilment of its mandate.

29. The Human Rights Council was informed at the time of adoption of the resolution that total full costs of the activities envisaged would amount to $417,800 under section 23, Human rights, of the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007.

30. In implementing the activities, the estimated requirements have been revised upward to an amount of $537,500 to provide for travel of the members of the Commission of Inquiry and support staff, general temporary assistance, contractual services, general operating expenses, supplies, materials and equipment.

31. At the time the Human Rights Council considered the resolution the Secretariat informed it that the expenditures required to implement the resolution were additional to provisions under section 23 of the 2006-2007 programme budget. The Council was also informed that the additional requirements could not be met from the contingency fund as other activities in the biennium 2006-2007 charged against the fund were expected to exhaust the fund prior to the sixty-first session of the General Assembly. Nor was it possible to identify activities under section 23 of

the 2006-2007 programme budget that could be curtailed, deferred, terminated or modified in order to meet the additional requirement of $417,800.

32. Since the time of the second special session, the Secretariat has undertaken a thorough review of the use of resources available under section 23, Human rights, as well as anticipated expenditures for the balance of the biennium and has reached the conclusion that the entire requirement, revised upward to $537,500 since consideration at the second special session, can be absorbed under section 23, Human rights, of the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007.

## G. Decision 1/102: Extension by the Human Rights Council of all mandates, mechanisms, functions and responsibilities of the Commission on Human Rights

33. Under the terms of its decision 1/102, inter alia, the Council:

(a) Decided to extend exceptionally for one year, subject to the review to be undertaken by the Council in conformity with General Assembly resolution 60/251, the mandates and the mandate holders of all the Commission's special procedures of the Subcommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights as well as the procedure established in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1503 (XLVIII) of 27 May 1970, as listed in the annex to the decision;

(b) Requested the special procedures, the Subcommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and the procedure established in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1503 (XLVIII) to continue with the implementation of their mandates and OHCHR to continue to provide the necessary support to them;

(c) Decided that the final session of the Subcommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights would be convened starting on 31 July 2006 for a period of up to four weeks, if so decided by the Subcommission, including its pre-sessional and in-sessional working groups, and that due priority would be given to preparing:

(i) A paper on the Subcommission's record giving its own vision and recommendations for future expert advice to the Council, to be submitted to the Council in 2006;

(ii) A detailed list describing the status of all the Subcommission's ongoing studies as well as an overall review of its activities, to be submitted to the Council in 2006.

34. Budgetary provisions have already been made for the activities related to the various human rights mandates listed in the annex to the decision, within resources approved for the biennium 2006-2007. These fall under section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management, section 23, Human rights, and section 28E, Administration, Geneva, of the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007.

## H. Decision 1/103: Universal periodic review

35. Under the terms of paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of its decision 1/103, the Council:

(a) Decided to establish an intercessional open-ended intergovernmental working group to develop the modalities of the universal periodic review mechanism;

(b) Decided that the Working Group would have at its disposal 10 days (or 20 three-hour meetings) of fully serviced meetings;

(c) Decided that informal consultations could begin immediately through an open-ended consultative process in order to compile proposals and relevant information and experiences, to facilitate open-ended discussions appropriately scheduled by the Chairperson with the involvement of all stakeholders.

36. Total full costs of conference servicing, travel and daily subsistence allowance requirements envisaged in connection with preparation and organizing of the meetings of the Working Group would amount to $370,300 in the biennium 2006-2007 as follows:

| | *United States dollars* |
|---|---|
| Section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management | 330 900 |
| Section 23, Human rights | 32 800 |
| Section 28E, Administration, Geneva | 6 600 |
| **Total** | **370 300** |

37. Requirements related to the conference costs have been provided under section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management, of the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007. As regards to the residual costs of $39,400, it is anticipated that the requirements would be absorbed within existing provisions for section 23, Human rights, and section 28E, Administration, Geneva, of the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007.

## I. Decision 1/104: Implementation of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 60/251

38. By its decision 1/104, the Council:

(a) Decided to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group to formulate concrete recommendations on the issue of reviewing and, where necessary, improving and rationalizing all mandates, mechanisms, functions and responsibilities in order to maintain a system of special procedures, expert advice and a complaint procedure, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 60/251, through open-ended, intercessional, transparent, well-scheduled and inclusive consultations, with the participation of all stakeholders;

(b) Decided that the Working Group would have at its disposal 20 days (or 40 three-hour meetings) of fully-serviced meetings, and that it would allow sufficient time and flexibility for the fulfilment of its mandate;

(c) Decided that informal consultations could begin immediately through an open-ended consultative process in order to compile proposals and relevant information and experiences, to facilitate open-ended discussions appropriately scheduled by the Chairperson with the involvement of all stakeholders;

(d) Requested OHCHR to provide the Working Group with background information on the functioning of the mandates and mechanisms and to compile the contributions of all stakeholders, including the inputs of the special procedures, the Subcommission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and non-governmental organizations;

(e) Requested the Working Group to report to it regularly, starting in September 2006, on progress made to allow for the completion of the review, as requested in paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 60/251.

39. Adoption of the decision by the Human Rights Council gave rise to total full costs estimated at $738,600 for conference servicing, travel and daily subsistence allowance requirements in the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007 as reflected below:

| | *United States dollars* |
|---|---|
| Section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management | 692 700 |
| Section 23, Human rights | 32 800 |
| Section 28E, Administration, Geneva | 13 100 |
| **Total** | **738 600** |

40. Provision already exists in section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management, in respect of conference costs. As regards the residual costs of $45,900, it is anticipated that the requirements would be absorbed within existing provisions for section 23, Human rights, and section 28E, Administration, Geneva, of the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007.

## J. Decision 1/106: Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories

41. By its decision 1/106, the Council:

(a) Requested the relevant special rapporteurs to report to the Council at its next session on the Israeli human rights violations in occupied Palestine;

(b) Decided to undertake substantive consideration of the human rights violations and implications of the Israeli occupation of Palestine and other occupied Arab territories at its next session and to incorporate the issue in its following sessions.

42. Adoption of the decision by the Human Rights Council gave rise to total full costs in the amount of $97,700, for travel, daily subsistence allowance and general operating expenses during field missions. Provisions for these activities had already been included under the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007. Accordingly, no additional appropriation would be required.

## K. President's statement 1/PRST.1: Entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

43. Under the terms of paragraphs 1 and 3 of the President's statement 1/PRST.1, the Council.

(a) Welcomed the entry into force, on 22 June 2006, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment following ratification by 20 States;

(b) Requested the Secretary-General to ensure, within the overall budgetary framework of the United Nations, the provision of adequate staff and facilities for the bodies and mechanisms involved in combating torture and assisting victims of torture commensurate with the strong support expressed by Member States for combating torture and assisting victims of torture.

44. Paragraph 1 of article 2, part I, of the Optional Protocol states that a Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of the Committee against Torture would be established and would carry out the functions laid down in the Protocol. In accordance with article 5, part II, the Subcommittee would consist of 10 members. After the fiftieth ratification of or accession to the Protocol, the number of the members of the Subcommittee would increase to 25. The members of the Subcommittee would serve in their individual capacity.

45. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 10, part II, of the Optional Protocol provide that the Subcommittee would establish its own rules of procedure and that after its initial meeting, the Subcommittee would meet at such times as provided by its rules of procedure.

46. In paragraph 1 of article 25 the Optional Protocol states that expenditures incurred by the Subcommittee in the implementation of the Protocol would be borne by the United Nations. Paragraph 2 of article 25, states that the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of the functions of the Subcommittee under the Optional Protocol.

47. In accordance with the Optional Protocol (article 7 (b)), elections to the Subcommittee should be held not later than six months after the entry into force of the Protocol, i.e., before 22 December 2006.

48. Upon its decision to adopt the terms of the President's statement, the Human Rights Council was informed of the programme budget implications for the biennium 2006-2007. It is estimated that provisions of approximately $2,373,300 (net of staff assessment) would be required for the regular budget. This estimate is based on the assumption that the Subcommittee will consist of 10 members, that it will hold its first organizational meeting in December 2006 and that it will hold

three sessions in 2007, each for a duration of one week. As there are presently 20 States parties, it is estimated that the Subcommittee may undertake four missions in 2007 and keep to a periodicity of visits to each State party to one visit every five years. It is also assumed (on the basis of the experience of the visits carried out by the Committee against Torture to States parties to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) that each mission will require approximately 8 to 12 weeks preparatory work and be of at least two weeks duration each, and require 4 to 8 weeks post-session work including the drafting of reports. It is also expected that follow-up missions will require approximately 4 to 6 weeks preparatory work plus three days mission and 2 to 4 weeks post-session work, including the drafting of reports. Each mission is expected to consist of members, experts, staff and interpreters, if required.

49. The minimum Secretariat support needed to provide substantive services to the Subcommittee would consist of 1 P-4, 2 P-3 and 1 General Service posts as of 2007.

50. In 2002, at the time of the adoption of the Optional Protocol, the programme budget implications statement (A/C.3/57/L.42) estimated requirements of $2,082,700. Consequently, the current estimate of $2,373,300 (net) reflects modifications of the requirements identified in that statement based on recent experience.

51. The estimated requirements of $2,373,300 (net of staff assessment) or $2,420,400 (gross) are reflected below:

| | *United States dollars* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | *2006* | *2007* | *2006-2007* |
| Conference services | | | |
| Section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management | 194 800 | 1 347 600 | 1 542 400 |
| Section 28E, Administration, Geneva | 700 | 3 300 | 4 000 |
| **Subtotal** | **195 500** | **1 350 900** | **1 546 400** |
| Section 23, Human rights | | | |
| Staff costs (1 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 GS) | | 278 900 | 278 900 |
| Travel of representatives | | 391 000 | 391 000 |
| Travel of staff and other travel | | 113 600 | 113 600 |
| Office automation equipment | | 9 200 | 9 200 |
| **Subtotal** | | **792 700** | **792 700** |
| Section 28E, Administration, Geneva | | | |
| General operating expenses | | 23 600 | 23 600 |
| Furniture and fixtures | | 10 600 | 10 600 |
| **Subtotal** | | **34 200** | **34 200** |
| Section 35, Staff assessment | | 47 100 | 47 100 |
| Income from staff assessment | | (47 100) | (47 100) |
| **Total requirements** | **195 500** | **2 177 800** | **2 373 300** |

52. Provisions already exist in section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management, of the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007 in respect of conference-servicing costs. Additional provisions are however, required for the biennium 2006-2007 for activities of the Subcommittee as follows: $792,700 under section 23, Human rights; $38,200 under section 28E, Administration, Geneva; and $47,100 under section 35, Staff assessment, offset by an equivalent amount under income section 1, Income from staff assessment.

53. At the time that the Human Rights Council considered the President's statement, the Secretariat informed it that there were no provisions to implement the activities required under section 23, Human rights and under section 28E, Administration, Geneva. The Council was also informed that the additional requirements could not be met from the contingency fund as other activities in the biennium 2006-2007 charged against the fund were expected to exhaust the fund during the main part of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly. Nor was it possible to identify activities under sections 23 and 28E of the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007 that could be curtailed, deferred, terminated or modified in order to meet the net additional requirements of $830,900.

54. Since the time of the first session of the Council, the Secretariat has undertaken a thorough review of the use of resources available under section 23, Human rights, and section 28E, Administration, Geneva, as well as anticipated expenditures for the balance of the biennium and has reached the conclusion that the entire requirement, $830,900, could be accommodated under section 23, Human rights ($792,700) and section 28E, Administration, Geneva ($38,200).

## III. Overall requirements and conclusion

55. As shown in the annex to the present report, the implications of the resolutions, decisions and President's statements adopted by the Human Rights Council at its first session and its first and second special sessions in 2006 give rise to total requirements of $6,033,300. Of this total, provisions for $4,328,600 already exist in the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007. It is anticipated that the balance of $1,704,700 would be accommodated within the resources already appropriated under the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007 and as may be necessary reported in the context of the second performance report. Requirements relating to the biennium 2008-2009 would be considered in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009.

*Notes*

[1] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 53* (A/61/53), chap. II.

# Annex

## Summary of requirements resulting from resolutions and decisions of the Human Rights Council at its first session and its first and second special sessions in 2006[a]

(United States dollars)

| | | 2006-2007 | | | | Requirements for 2008-2009 to be considered in the context of the proposed programme budget for 2008-2009 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Budget section | Requirements | Existing provision in the programme budget | To be accommodated from the existing appropriation[b] | |
| Human Rights Council resolutions | | | | | | |
| 1/1 | International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance | 2 | — | — | — | |
| | | 23 | — | — | — | 1 024 000 |
| | | 28E | — | — | — | 846 700 |
| | | 35 | — | — | — | 9 900 |
| | | IS1 | — | — | — | 74 600 |
| | | | | | | (74 600) |
| 1/3 | Open-ended Working Group on an optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights | 2 | 794 400 | 794 400 | — | |
| | | 23 | 23 200 | — | 23 200 | |
| | | 28E | 13 200 | 13 200 | — | |
| 1/4 | The right to development | 2 | 360 600 | 360 600 | — | |
| | | 23 | 110 800 | 110 800 | — | |
| | | 28E | 6 600 | 6 600 | | |
| 1/5 | Intergovernmental Working Group on the effective implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action | 2 | 372 700 | 372 700 | — | 758 700 |
| | | 23 | 200 500 | — | 200 500 | |
| | | 28E | 6 600 | 6 600 | — | |
| S-1/1 | Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory | 23 | 27 300 | — | 27 300 | |
| S-2/1 | The grave situation of human rights in Lebanon caused by Israeli military operations | 23 | 537 500 | — | 537 500 | |
| Human Rights Council decisions | | | | | | |
| 1/103 | Universal periodic review | 2 | 330 900 | 330 900 | — | |
| | | 23 | 32 800 | — | 32 800 | |
| | | 28E | 6 600 | — | 6 600 | |
| 1/104 | Implementation of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 60/251 | 2 | 692 700 | 692 700 | — | |
| | | 23 | 32 800 | — | 32 800 | |
| | | 28E | 13 100 | — | 13 100 | |

| | | 2006-2007 | | | | Requirements for 2008-2009 to be considered in the context of the proposed programme budget for 2008-2009 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Budget section* | *Requirements* | *Existing provision in the programme budget* | *To be accommodated from the existing appropriation*[b] | |
| 1/106 | Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories | 23 | 97 700 | 97 700 | — | |
| President's statements | | | | | | |
| 2006/PRST.1 | Entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment | 2 | 1 542 400 | 1 542 400 | — | |
| | | 23 | 792 700 | — | 792 700 | |
| | | 28E | 38 200 | — | 38 200 | |
| **Total** | | | **6 033 300** | **4 328 600** | **1 704 700** | **2 639 300** |

[a] The provisions have already been incorporated for the activities requested by the Human Rights Council relating to decision 1/102, under the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007. Accordingly, this decision is not included in the annex.

[b] To be reported, as necessary, in the context of the second performance report.

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# Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations

## Report of the Secretary-General*

*Summary*

In resolution 59/276 (XI), by which the General Assembly established the Department of Safety and Security, the Secretary-General was requested to report to the Assembly at its sixtieth session on the implementation of the resolution. An interim report was submitted by the Secretary-General (A/60/424) and was considered by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in its report (A/60/7/Add.9). Consideration of the report by the Assembly was, however, deferred to the sixty-first session. Accordingly, the present report provides updated information on the progress achieved in establishing a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations, both at Headquarters and in the field, as proposed by the Secretary-General (A/59/365 and Add.1) and approved by the Assembly. It also identifies those areas where additional work is needed to ensure that the Department is in a position to manage new requirements identified over the past 18 months and to respond to unforeseen emergency situations, and is submitted in compliance with paragraph 56 of resolution 59/276 (XI), whereby the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to examine the possibility for further integration and rationalization of the security management system and to report thereon to the Assembly at its sixty-first session.

* The report is submitted at the present time owing to the need for extensive consultations with offices.

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# I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 59/276 (XI), the General Assembly decided to establish a Department of Safety and Security so as to provide a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations. In compliance with that resolution, the Secretary-General submitted an interim report to the Assembly at its sixtieth session on progress achieved in implementation of the resolution (A/60/424). The present report is submitted to provide updated information on the implementation of resolution 59/276 (XI).

2. While emphasizing in resolution 59/276 (XI) that the primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of United Nations-system staff and premises rests with the host country, the General Assembly reinforced security operations in all locations and decided to establish a unified capacity for policy, standards, coordination, communications, compliance and threat and risk assessment. The resolution also brought the security management components of the former Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, the Security and Safety Service at Headquarters, as well as such services at offices away from Headquarters and the regional commissions, and the civilian security component of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations into a single security management framework.

3. The Department has been striving to achieve objectives including: (a) to support and enable the effective conduct of United Nations activities by ensuring a coherent, effective and timely response to all security-related threats and other emergencies; (b) to ensure effective risk mitigation through the establishment of a coordinated security threat and risk assessment mechanism within the framework of a common, system-wide methodology; (c) to develop high-quality, best-practice security policies, standards and operational procedures across the United Nations system, including the appropriate degree of standardization; (d) to support implementation and monitor compliance with those security policies, standards and operational procedures; and (e) to ensure the most cost-effective provision and employment of security personnel by taking advantage of economies of scale and through centrally directed recruitment, selection, training, deployment and career development.

# II. Progress within the Department of Safety and Security

## A. Executive direction and management

### Office of the Under-Secretary-General

4. The Under-Secretary-General has devoted much of his time to directing and managing operational requirements in crisis situations, including cases of hostage-taking and evacuations, overseeing the integration of the various security structures, visiting field locations, consulting with executive heads of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and participating in and contributing to policy committees, task forces and high-level panels. He has also participated in meetings of intergovernmental and inter-agency bodies, international conferences and regional events.

5. Bearing in mind the responsibility of host countries in ensuring the safety and security of United Nations-system staff and premises, the Under-Secretary-General has intensified his contacts with Member States, both through their permanent missions to the United Nations and through direct contact with various responsible host-country authorities, in order to increase cooperation, improve lines of communication and guarantee necessary support.

6. The Office of the Under-Secretary-General is now fully staffed and operational, consisting of a Deputy (D-2), a Special Assistant (P-5), a Programme Assistant (P-3), General Service (Principal level) and three General Service (Other level) staff.

7. In paragraph 24 of its resolution 59/276 (XI), the General Assembly decided to establish a D-2 post of Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General and to review the post in the context of the implementation report to be submitted by the Secretary-General to the Assembly at its sixtieth session. Given the time it took to fill the senior-level posts in the Department of Safety and Security and so as to gain practical experience working within the approved structure, no such review was carried out in the context of the interim report submitted to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session (A/60/424). Eighteen months into the creation of the Department, it is now appropriate to reassess the situation.

8. The magnitude and scope of the operations of the Department of Safety and Security and the geographic spread of its deployment are virtually unique, even among United Nations-system entities. With a total staffing table of 1,830 in 150 locations and a biennial budget of approximately $400 million, the Department works to ensure the security and safety of United Nations staff worldwide. Sound leadership and management, continuity and consistency are indispensable in dealing with the critical issues and in sustaining its operations, which are carried out 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The Under-Secretary-General needs to rely on a fully empowered deputy with whom to share the full range of responsibilities at the top of the Department's structure, regarding both operational and managerial/administrative matters.

9. The direct involvement of the Under-Secretary-General in operational matters, as recommended by the General Assembly and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in its report A/59/539, para. 38), results in his extensive travel to critical areas around the globe. Therefore, a deputy to the Under-Secretary-General at the Assistant Secretary-General-level to replace the present D-2 Deputy position is crucial for the smooth functioning of the Department to fulfil the myriad complex tasks of a non-operational nature and to provide continuity of operations in the absence of the Under-Secretary-General. An addition, in the absence of the Under-Secretary-General, a deputy at the Assistant Secretary-General-level would enable the Department to participate from a position of parity in the various high-level panels, including the Secretary-General's policy committees and task forces, legislative bodies and with Member States.

10. To enable the Under-Secretary-General to focus on operational exigencies, the Assistant Secretary-General would manage the day-to-day activities of the Department of Safety and Security, with specific responsibility for directing and managing the Executive Office, the Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit, the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit and the Field Support Section.

11. The Assistant Secretary-General would liaise closely with the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes on all administrative matters, including cost-sharing arrangements. This entails regular dealings with counterparts in the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, most of whom are at the Assistant Secretary-General-level.

12. Finally, the Assistant Secretary-General would deputize for the Under-Secretary-General in the latter's absence, undertake missions on behalf of the Under-Secretary-General and represent the Under-Secretary-General at meetings of intergovernmental or inter-agency bodies, as well as at international conferences and other meetings on issues related to staff safety and security. Hence, it is proposed to reclassify the Deputy post from the D-2 level to the Assistant Secretary-General-level, effective January 2007, giving rise to additional requirements of $33,400 under section 33, Safety and security, and $6,800 under section 35, Staff assessment, to be offset by an equivalent amount under income section 1, Income from staff assessment, of the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007.

**Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit**

13. Selections for all posts in the Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit have been completed, with three of the six (50 per cent) staff currently on board and the rest in various stages of recruitment. As part of the integration and unification process, it is critical that there be a system in place for producing and organizing policy documents and developing a more structured approach to the management of policy documents across the Department of Safety and Security. Together with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN), which approves field security policy on behalf of the United Nations security management system, the Unit has initiated a policy management system which, inter alia, ensures compatibility and consistency of both substance and format in policy documents used by the United Nations security management system; provides a rigorous process for policy development for consideration by IASMN; assesses the likely implications of proposed policies on all aspects of United Nations work and takes into account the practicalities of implementation; and facilitates rapid access to policy and guidance by both managers and officials with security responsibilities and staff at large through the creation of a policy database.

14. As a first step, the *Field Security Handbook* and a number of specialized security directives have been updated and produced in the six official languages and disseminated to officials responsible for security. The Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit is developing standards against which implementation of security measures can be measured; once developed, those standards will provide compliance and evaluation teams with transparent and uniform benchmarks for assessing the level of compliance throughout the United Nations system. The Unit has also initiated a process to make key policy and procedure documents available on the Department website (see para. 25 below).

**Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit**

15. The staffing of the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit is 75 per cent complete (six of eight posts filled). Recruitment of the remaining two P-3 posts is ongoing. In very close cooperation with the Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit, through which security policy and procedures are set, work is ongoing to fulfil the

mandate of the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit to enable the implementation of programmes and mandates in as safe and secure a manner as possible by ensuring a standardized framework for the United Nations security management system. The Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit plans, develops, coordinates and monitors the standardized implementation of security policies in coordination with IASMN. In addition, the Unit enforces standards and recommends action in the event of non-compliance. To ensure a standardized, transparent and objective evaluation and monitoring process, the Unit has developed a software programme, reporting formats and an electronic database with a central repository for compliance information. As at July 2006, it had commenced its programme of compliance missions to duty stations where complex security management arrangements exist.

## B. Division of Regional Operations

16. The responsibilities of the Division of Regional Operations include: (a) coordinating safety and security issues among the organizations of the United Nations system; (b) monitoring the implementation of established security and safety policies; (c) developing security requirements for new missions as well as for special, regular and emergency operations; (d) in coordination with the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit, conducting field compliance missions to support the implementation, evaluate the effectiveness and monitor the compliance with security policies, standards and operational procedures; (e) assisting and monitoring the implementation of the minimum operating security standards at all duty stations and security components of peacekeeping operations, humanitarian and other special missions in the field; (f) carrying out situational analyses of the extent of participation of the host country in strengthening United Nations security; (g) updating security and safety guidelines and directives; (h) coordinating with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on the planning, implementation and review of safety and security programmes for peacekeeping, humanitarian and other special missions in the field.

17. The Director of the Division of Regional Operations assumed his functions in March 2006. The status of recruitment in the Division is 65 per cent at Headquarters, with 28 of the 43 posts filled. The Division consists of five regional desks, a threat and risk assessment capacity as well as a Peacekeeping Operations Support Service (see para. 46 below). The Division is fully operational and has been implementing its mandate of undertaking daily security coordination with the field and providing operational guidance to chief security advisers and security advisers; responding to all security incidents; mobilizing staff to the field, as necessary, to support the designated official in emergency situations; maintaining up-to-date information to provide to the Secretary-General and senior officials; and providing assistance in the event of hostage taking. Staff of the Division have travelled extensively to their regions of operation to provide assistance or undertake assessment missions.

18. The work of the Division of Regional Operations includes a small threat and risk assessment capacity established in accordance with paragraphs 33 to 39 of resolution 59/276 (XI). The security risk management model endorsed by IASMN in 2004 remains the primary tool throughout the United Nations system for identifying

emerging threats, determining areas of vulnerability and developing mitigating strategies and measures. It has become an essential element of the integrated security management system. To ensure that the security risk management model supports objective analyses which allow for informed decision-making and mitigating risk, and enabling agencies, funds and programmes to maintain an effective operational presence in the field, the model and procedures are kept under continuous review by the Department of Safety and Security and IASMN. In addition, assessments are compiled in full cooperation with the national authorities of respective host countries, who are kept informed of this process, and Member States, at their request, have been briefed on the methodology used by the Department. Specific procedures on how to weigh the reliability and validity of information from sources other than international organizations and Governments have been introduced in training programmes for security professionals in country offices and other components of the United Nations system.

19. In the field, 174 of the 250 professional posts (or 69.6 per cent) have been filled. Of the 369 local-level posts, 230 or 62.3 per cent have been filled. The security advisers/field security coordination officers are deployed in 146 countries to provide day-to-day technical support to designated officials and security management teams. The selection of the security advisers was carried out on an inter-agency basis with the full participation of representatives of agencies, funds and programmes as well as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Recruitment of locally recruited positions in the field is dependent upon the appointment of the security advisers and therefore is still in progress.

## C. Field Support Service

20. The responsibilities of the Field Support Service include: (a) developing crisis management response plans, capabilities and procedures; (b) translating security and critical-incident stress training standards into a coherent training programme for all participants in the United Nations security management system; (c) conducting regional workshops and seminars on security and safety issues, including on stress management; (d) developing and updating related training materials, taking into account gender-specific material; and (e) providing counselling services to staff exposed to critical-incident stress, as needed.

21. The Service, supervised by a D-1 level chief of service, consists of the Training and Development Section and the Critical Incident Stress Management Unit. The Service is 53.3 per cent staffed (16 of 30 posts filled), with the remaining vacancies at various stages of the recruitment process.

22. Training remains a high priority for the Department of Safety and Security. The following expanded training initiatives have been successfully implemented by the Training and Development Section: (a) a comprehensive three-week induction training programme with the participation of agencies, funds and programmes for newly appointed chief security advisers; (b) a three-week security certification programme to be successfully completed by all candidate security advisers prior to being issued a contract; and (c) regional two-week refresher training programmes for approximately 120 serving security advisers. To ensure consistency across the United Nations security management system, this programme has also been shared with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and agencies, funds and

programmes for use in training their security staff. The Department has also continued its support for the training provided by the United Nations Development Group for newly appointed resident coordinators who also serve as designated officials, and providing specialized training, such as hostage incident management. In view of the success of the CD-ROM "Basic Security in the Field", which was mandatory for all staff members of the United Nations system, the Training and Development Section has now developed "Advanced Security in the Field", an interactive learning course available in the six official languages that will be mandatory for all United Nations staff stationed in or travelling to a field location where a security phase is in effect. All of these activities respond to the concerns expressed by the General Assembly in paragraph 11 of its resolution 59/276 (XI), and greatly contribute to enhancing the culture of security awareness throughout the United Nations system. It should be noted that training in cultural diversity has also become an integral part of the security training package.

23. As part of its strategy to develop consistent awareness of the need to consider security as an integral part of all United Nations-system operations and to bring about a shift in organizational culture, a partnership with the United Nations System Staff College in Turin, Italy, has been initiated with a view to mainstreaming security training into the existing curriculum and programme of the College. The security awareness induction training, which has been provided to all staff entering Iraq, will be used as the model for that training.

24. The Critical Incident Stress Management Unit has focused its activities on (a) providing quality counselling and other psychosocial services for affected staff; (b) developing a harmonized United Nations approach to critical incident stress in emergencies, including the potential avian flu pandemic; and (c) promoting inter-agency and inter-service collaboration on critical incident stress. As part of that strategy, staff are now being trained to manage stress. In addition, critical incident stress intervention cells have been created to provide immediate assistance to staff at the country level and regional rapid intervention cells have been created to ensure urgent provision of psychosocial support to United Nations staff and their dependants in emergency situations.

25. In the Secretary-General's report on a strengthened and unified security management system (A/59/365*), the structure of the Field Support Service was also to include an Information System Support Unit. In accordance with resolution 59/276 (XI), those functions were provided by the Information Technology Services Division, which is responsible for the information technology infrastructure at Headquarters. However, information management technology is of critical importance for the Department's day-to-day operations and its services to its clients, as well as for managing emergencies where it is critical for information channels to be reliable. Important improvements have been achieved in that software programmes have been deployed to all security personnel to provide reliable and secure communications and business continuity capability in the field. The integrated security tracking system, which was recommended in the aftermath of the Canal Hotel as a means of knowing who is at the duty station, has become operational in three countries where there is a high volume of United Nations-system travellers (Colombia, the Philippines and Egypt) with further roll-outs planned. In an effort to enhance access to security information, the Department has expanded the access of its Internet website for members of the United Nations security management system.

26. However, much remains to be done. The Department of Safety and Security information management strategy seeks to provide an enabling technological framework which includes a learning management system to provide global on-line training capabilities to all Department staff, partners and clients; customized software applications for operational planning and management of Department field operations; virtual operations centres with integrated geographical information systems; and further enhancing security information management systems for all Department partners and IASMN members to enhance information-sharing and increase the efficiency of decision-making. The provision of the *Field Security Handbook* and other key policy and procedure documents in electronic form, together with a high quality search engine, would permit faster and more accurate responses to questions from the field as well as freeing staff time for other urgent tasks.

27. The need for an in-house information management and communications capacity has become clear with the experience gained in the past 18 months. The Information Technology Services Division fulfils all the Department's information technology needs, but is unable to fully meet the requirements when it comes to information management. Currently, all design and development work is being funded through voluntary contributions, while all other coordination and support is being provided through informal arrangements within the Department, and occasional assistance from the Information Technology Services Division. In order to fully respond to departmental needs, an Information Management and Communications Section is required to coordinate the development and management of complex specialized information systems and provide implementation support as well as help desk service to ensure the sustainability of those critical systems deployed worldwide and to ensure a departmental communications strategy. In the report of the Secretary-General (A/60/846/Add.1), a Secretariat-wide upgrading of information and communication technology systems was proposed. In its resolution 60/283, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to provide a review indicating any substantive improvements to the information and communication technology that may be required. The requirements noted in the present report will form part of that review, which is to be submitted during the resumed sixty-first session.

## D. Division of Security and Safety Services

28. The responsibilities of the Division of Security and Safety Services include: (a) increasing the level of preparedness for managing crisis and emergency situations; (b) coordinating the standardization of safety and security policies and monitoring their implementation; (c) implementing and complying with headquarters minimum operating security standards; (d) enhancing coordination of security and safety-related efforts with the host-country authorities; (e) enhancing security awareness among delegations and staff; (f) improving emergency response and evacuation time efficiency at United Nations headquarters and regional commissions; (g) increasing the level of professionalism of the security and safety personnel through the provision of specialized training on a continuous basis, which will also maximize the use of officers for multiple specialized security functions; (h) in coordination with the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit, conducting compliance missions to support the implementation, evaluate the

effectiveness and monitor the compliance with security policies, standards and operational procedures. Priority is given to enhanced coordination of close protection operations by developing training standards and programmes for United Nations security officers, raising awareness among staff and VIPs on working with a close protection team and by taking stock of all regular and ongoing protection operations.

29. The integration and standardization of the previously independent Security and Safety Services at the offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions have been the main programme of work of the Division since its establishment. The Director of the Division assumed his functions in January 2006; since then he has visited offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, enhancing communications and engaging host-country authorities. Daily and monthly reporting mechanisms have been established and periodic video conferences have proven to be an effective forum for consultation and discussion of operational priorities and new initiatives. Reporting guidelines have been drafted and circulated, with formal promulgation to follow the issuance of the Secretary-General's bulletin on the Department.

30. In paragraph 25 of its resolution 59/276 (XI), the General Assembly decided to review the post of the head of the Division of Safety and Security Services in the context of the implementation report to be submitted by the Secretary-General to the Assembly. The Director of the Division provides policy direction, operational guidance and overall technical supervision to the Security and Safety Services in New York and at the other headquarters locations and regional commissions. As described in the Secretary-General's interim report (A/60/424), the D-2 level is required to guarantee the highest technical standards of performance across all the United Nations Security and Safety Services. The Director ensures the provision of safety and security programmes that provide for an optimal level of security in order to protect staff, delegates, visiting dignitaries and other visitors to United Nations premises, to prevent damage to United Nations property and to provide safe and secure facilities. In addition, the Director oversees the coordination and provides guidance for the close protection of senior United Nations officials.

31. The Director at the D-2 level is essential to ensure that the United Nations is able to meet the unique security challenges faced at United Nations headquarters locations and regional commissions. The Director possesses the leadership and managerial qualities to provide strategic guidance for the transformation of the Security and Safety Services into an integrated global United Nations security service. This transformation is not expected to be an easy task, in particular since the Security and Safety Services at the headquarters and regional commissions were, in the past, mostly autonomous entities, with no common governance or security doctrine. That resulted in the delivery of services with different standards with respect to operational procedures, staff recruitment, career opportunities and rewards, equipment levels and training standards. While that approach may have been sufficient to address security concerns in the past, today's security environment requires the Director to provide the strategic leadership and guidance to enable the United Nations to truly standardize its security resources in a manner that is flexible and that operates on a common security doctrine across the world, including standardized policies and procedures, standard operating procedures, recruitment and promotion systems, and specialized equipment.

32. As the Professional head of the United Nations uniformed security service personnel, including the chiefs of those services whose level varies from P-4 to D-1, it is essential to maintain the D-2 level in order to provide quality leadership to more than 1,000 security personnel. Given the scope of the responsibilities and the expertise involved in developing and maintaining up-to-date operational and professional development concepts and approaches on a global scale, as well as the importance of maintaining a balance between two Divisions within the Department (the Division of Security and Safety Services and the Division of Regional Operations), there is a continuing need for the D-2 level for this position.

33. In October 2005, the Division conducted an assessment of the security posture at the offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions that resulted in a number of recommendations which are currently being implemented. Those actions relate to the Headquarters Minimum Operating Security Standards (HMOSS) implementation, operational procedures, physical security and safety installations, host-country cooperation and the use of resources.

34. Further progress has been made in the standardization of services and operations, training (see also paras. 22-23 above) and policies. The Division has developed a consistent methodology and standard operating procedures for the assessment and deployment of close protection teams in order to facilitate rapid deployment and improved inter-operability of staff. The Division provides continuing protection to the Independent Investigation Commission in Lebanon and supported close protection operations in Iraq, Lebanon, Thailand, Timor-Leste and the Sudan, among other destinations. In cooperation with the Office of Legal Affairs, the Division commenced the review of existing and the development of new policies and procedures, such as a comprehensive weapons policy, a standby arrangement structure with Member States and use of force policy.

35. To achieve full integration of all services, the Division has been working on the modernization of equipment, staff recruitment and testing procedures, harmonization of rank structures as well as opportunities for mobility and career development. It has catalogued the specialist equipment present at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions, for example, communication equipment, weapons and protective clothing, within a central database, with a view to maximizing its use and to enable rapid redeployment in response to urgent needs. Full integration of staff and administration, including harmonization of contracts, recruitment and career development, have proven to be more challenging (see para. 49).

36. In its resolution 59/276 (XI), the General Assembly decided to establish 383 new Security Officer posts at the Local, General Service and Security Service levels, of which 249 are established posts and 134 are temporary posts. In addition, by Assembly decision 60/562, eight additional security officer posts were established to provide security support at the new premises of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Since the establishment of the Department, all previously outsourced Security and Safety Services contracts were discontinued at the offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. The deployment of the posts by duty station is shown in the table below.

Table 1
**Department of Security Officer posts**

| *Duty station* | *(a) Original* | *(b) Approved in 59/276 and decision 60/562* | | *(c) = a + b Total posts* | *(d) Vacant posts* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Established posts* | *Temporary posts* | | |
| New York | 226 | 56 | 32 | 314 | 19 |
| United Nations Office at Geneva | 80 | 42 | 20 | 142 | 27 |
| United Nations Office at Vienna | 94 | 37 | 21 | 152 | 8 |
| United Nations Office at Nairobi | 69 | 32 | 15 | 116 | 9 |
| Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific | 54 | 14 | 7 | 75 | 1 |
| Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean | 23 | 17 | 9 | 49 | 9 |
| Economic Commission for Africa | 44 | 47 | 23 | 114 | 22 |
| Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia | 34 | 12 | 7 | 53 | 4 |
| **Total** | **624** | **257** | **134** | **1 015** | **99** |

37. Currently there are 99 vacant posts, caused by a combination of security officers being on mission assignment and the delays in the recruitment process at some duty stations. From August 2005 to July 2006, on an average monthly basis, 88 security officers from all duty stations were on mission assignments. Such assignments are an essential component of the duties of security officers to rapidly meet security requirements in peacekeeping and other missions. They contribute to further integration of the security services, promote career development of the officers and are highly motivational.

38. A detailed overview of the functions which are being performed by the 391 new positions is shown in the table below. In addition to enhancing the physical security at Headquarters and at the offices away from Headquarters, the establishment of the posts has considerably reduced the overtime requirements. In most of the duty stations, the working shifts have been changed from 12 to 8-hour shifts per day, which, in addition to the reduction of overtime, has allowed for more accuracy in surveillance and control and created greater flexibility and effectiveness in the management and deployment of staff.

| *Functions/assignment* | *United Nations New York* | *United Nations Office at Nairobi* | *United Nations Office at Vienna* | *United Nations Office at Geneva* | *Economic Commission for Africa* | *Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific* | *Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia* | *Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean* | ***Total*** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Security planning special operations and quality control | 4 | | | | | | | | **4** |
| Personal protection | 7 | | | | 6 | | 3 | 1 | **17** |
| Annex building postings and patrols | 9 | 4 | | 12 | 20 | | | | **45** |
| Counter-surveillance and emergency response | 15 | | | | | | | | **15** |
| Security Control Centre | 8 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | **35** |
| Patrols and internal postings within the main compound | 29 | 11 | 24 | 35 | 19 | 4 | 1 | 5 | **128** |
| In-house canine operations | 8 | | | | | | | | **8** |
| Fire and hazardous material safety | 2 | 2 | 9 | | 5 | | 1 | | **19** |
| Threat assessment and crisis management | 4 | 8 | | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | | **21** |
| Security and safety training | 2 | | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | **10** |
| Pass and Identification Unit | | 1 | | 2 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | **12** |
| Pedestrian and vehicle access control | | 16 | 23 | 6 | 4 | 8 | 6 | 14 | **77** |
| **Total** | **88** | **47** | **58** | **62** | **70** | **21** | **19** | **26** | **391** |

39. While it is the responsibility of host countries to provide external perimeter security for the United Nations Headquarters and facilities at offices away from Headquarters, it is the responsibility of the United Nations to ensure security inside the premises. Meetings, conferences and the high number of visitors to headquarters locations create an increased demand for the United Nations Security and Safety Services. For each event inside United Nations premises, operations related to safety and security such as ID issuance, access control and evacuation instructions, increase the security workload. The table below details some of the activities that were covered by the Security and Safety Services during the first six months of 2006 and demonstrates the continuing need for all posts. Therefore, it is proposed to convert the temporary posts to established posts.

Table 2
**Number of significant events, visitors and identity cads issued from January through June 2006**

| *Duty station* | *Special events* | *VIP visits* | *Visitors* | *United Nations identity cards issued* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Nations New York | 554 | 230 | 646 550 | 70 828 |
| United Nations Office at Geneva | 362 | 76 | 89 713 | 27 152 |
| United Nations Office at Vienna | 288 | 26 | 72 988 | 18 947 |
| United Nations Office at Nairobi | 191 | 10 | 23 844 | 5 932 |
| Economic Commission for Africa | 145 | 9 | 20 746 | 4 695 |
| Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific | 182 | 9 | 31 826 | 1 778 |
| Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean | 167 | 7 | 7 667 | 1 103 |
| Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia | 157 | 6 | 20 212 | 1 686 |

## E. Executive Office

40. The staffing level of the Executive Office is currently at 82 per cent (14 of 17 posts filled) and all administrative support heretofore provided by the Executive Office of the Department of Management is now provided by the Executive Office of the Department of Safety and Security. In addition to providing administrative and programme support in personnel, financial and general administrative matters at Headquarters, the Executive Office collaborates with chiefs of administration at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions to ensure appropriate and consistent administrative arrangements for the Security and Safety Services. The Executive Office is also responsible for the selection and career management of security advisers/security coordination officers assigned to field positions. That includes the maintenance of a roster of qualified candidates to fill field positions in about 150 countries. The United Nations Development Programme, through a bilateral agreement with the United Nations, continues to administer and support

those field security officers on behalf of the Department of Safety and Security. Such support includes the daily administration of resources.

# III. Security issues

## A. Recruitment

41. Of a total of 1,830 posts worldwide, 1,536 or 84 per cent have been filled. Delays in recruitment are a result of the large number of candidates and the intensive screening process required. As indicated in paragraph 42 below, recruiting for posts in the field is taking longer than anticipated owing to the need to achieve gender parity.

| *Location* | *Authorized posts* | *Encumbered* | *Encumbered (percentage)* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Department of Safety and Security Headquarters (including Security and Safety Service) | 465 | 417 | 90 |
| Security and Safety Services at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions | 746 | 652 | 87 |
| Field security operations | 619 | 467 | 75 |
| **Total** | **1 830** | **1 536** | **84** |

## B. Geography and gender

42. The Department of Safety and Security has experienced significant difficulties in identifying and recruiting qualified women security officers. In an effort to achieve greater gender parity, the Department is making efforts to fill the remaining positions with women. To that end, the Under-Secretary-General has written to all Member States requesting their assistance in identifying such women. In addition, contacts have been made with professional associations of women police and military officers in an effort to identify qualified candidates.

43. Mindful of the value and importance of preserving the international character of the Organization, special efforts have been made to achieve as wide a geographical balance as possible without compromising the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. Close to 85 nationalities are now represented in the Department and efforts continue to improve that representation even further.

## C. Framework for accountability

44. As requested by the General Assembly in paragraphs 13 and 14 of its resolution 59/276 (XI), the United Nations security management accountability framework, approved by the Assembly in 2002, was extensively reviewed and updated by IASMN at its annual meeting in April 2005. Thereafter, the revised accountability framework was submitted to the High-level Committee on

Management, which discussed the document. Concerns were expressed by several specialized agencies regarding the accountability of executive directors of specialized agencies to the Secretary-General. However, following further negotiations, it was possible for agreement to be reached by all organizations, with the exception of the World Bank. The agreed text is contained in annex I to the present report.

## D. Cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

45. In paragraph 40 of its resolution 59/276 (XI), the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to provide information on strengthening the cooperation between the Department of Safety and Security and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations with respect to security decisions that may affect the conduct of peacekeeping operations in the framework of a unified security management system led by the Department of Safety and Security.

46. In order to ensure full coordination at all levels, the Under-Secretaries-General for Safety and Security and Peacekeeping Operations consult on a regular basis in the context of the Department of Safety and Security-Department of Peacekeeping Operations Standing Committee on Security to review security issues that may affect missions directed and supported by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As outlined in paragraph 17 above, the Department of Safety and Security Peacekeeping Operations Support Service is now operational. The Department of Safety and Security and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have organized joint evaluation/assistance visits to most of the missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in order to assist those missions and support the Security Council in its decision-making. Examples of those visits include security assistance missions to the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste, the United Nations Operation in Burundi, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Support Service provides technical security advice and coordinates the provision of security assistance from technical experts, for example blast effects experts in support of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force or physical security in the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia.

47. In order to standardize United Nations field security equipment and achieve economies of scale, a Joint Technical Specifications Working Group has been established to review field security equipment requirements and carry out research on and recommend technical specifications standards for such equipment for both Departments. The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security provides the final approval for such standards. As at July 2006, some 44 security equipment items have been standardized through the Working Group.

48. In those areas where a mission directed and/or supported by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is deployed, security is an operational function that cuts

across all military, police and civilian activities, ranging from planning to contingency response, and in this way forms an integral part of Security Council mandate implementation. Security synchronization therefore aims at cooperation and integration of the security capacities of the host country and of the mission's military, police and civilian components. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations-led Darfur Planning Team, which established common facilities and integrated security at the initial planning stages, led to significant improvements in the protection of staff. Co-location, as in MINUSTAH and UNMIS, and the ability to instantly integrate information, has enabled both Departments to be proactive in identifying evolving threats which may affect the mission and to avoid delays in decision-making and response. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has pursued, in full consultation with the Department of Safety and Security and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, the development of a unified and integrated security management system, with sole responsibility for security management for civilian personnel vested in the designated official. Designated officials and chief security advisers have been appointed in Western Sahara, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Syria, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Kosovo (Serbia), Liberia, the Sudan, India/Pakistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Israel and Iraq. All non-military security elements have now been included in the accountability framework (see para. 44 above). Finally, as part of crisis management, the two Departments have developed close working relationships, as recently demonstrated through the establishment and operation of a joint Crisis Operations Group and Crisis Coordination Centre that provided crisis coordination to address the United Nations staff relocations as a consequence of the Lebanon crisis. The Crisis Coordination Centre comprised staff from both Departments as well as other departments, offices, agencies, funds and programmes, and served as a focus for coordination of the efforts of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, the International Independent Investigation Commission, specialized agencies, funds and programmes.

49. As is the case with the Division of Security and Safety Services, while significant progress has been made with regard to operational and policy integration, financial, personnel and administrative integration remains a significant challenge. Different conditions of service of security officers in the field, dependent upon their source of appointment, have become a contentious issue that affects security staff morale and has the potential to degrade the integrated security management system. It is anticipated that these differences for Professional staff will be addressed by the proposals for human resources management reform which provide for the appointment of United Nations staff under one series of the Staff Rules and the harmonization of conditions of service in the field for United Nations Secretariat staff with those of the funds and programmes, in order to ensure greater equity of treatment for all staff (see A/61/255, sections VI and VII).

## E. Crisis management

50. The Department of Safety and Security has established an operational concept for establishing a Crisis Coordination Centre within the Department. As noted in paragraph 48 above, the Centre greatly advanced the crisis management approach

and established a firm foundation for further progress. In addition, field security officers (and alternates) are maintained on a rotating standby roster, ready to be deployed anywhere in the world on 24 to 48 hours' notice. Selected security advisers and field security officers have received specialized training to help them support all United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination teams deployed to an emergency area. Recognizing the need for expanded crisis management cooperation with the international community, the Department has identified opportunities to rehearse response plans to enhance inter-operability and collaboration. In this regard, the Department jointly sponsored and chaired the "Bright Horizons" exercise with Interpol and the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in 2005 and 2006. Lessons learned have been integrated in all Department training programmes.

51. Overall, the Department of Safety and Security has enhanced significantly its capacity to provide security support in multipartner international emergency operations and has a crisis management structure in place to handle a crisis of limited scope, duration and complexity. It is clear, however, that any major crisis confronting the Organization will involve a great number of departments, agencies, funds and programmes within the United Nations system. The Department is planning to gradually assume a leading role in crisis response and crisis management for the United Nations system. Accordingly, it has proposed that the Organization develop a coordinated system-wide emergency response capacity that would meet the challenges of the present security environment. The intention is to develop and refine concepts and plans, some of which already exist within the system, in a manner which would ultimately lead to the creation of a cooperative crisis management network or partnership that would serve the Organization as a whole. In this regard, it is foreseen that to improve the capacity of the United Nations to initiate a rapid and coordinated response to any emergency, it will require the establishment of an authoritative decision-making process; an effective and integrated communications strategy based on a fully manned and operational United Nations Crisis Operations Centre; and the development of common standards and shared procedures. Developing such a comprehensive response network will take considerable staff effort and resources. In this respect, the Department of Safety and Security will need to: (a) enhance the Department's existing 24 hours a day, 7 days a week communications centre capabilities and resources to better facilitate crisis management and continuity of operations; (b) develop and implement global communications capabilities with the field to include secure communications (e.g. Groove and other encrypted devices), where needed, as well as an information reporting protocol; and (c) develop and implement departmental plans for continuity of operations, including maintaining key information and communications technologies during an emergency or crisis event. In the interim, a small team will be formed using existing resources. Following review of the operations of this small team, ongoing requirements related to crisis management would be considered in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009.

## F. Cost-sharing arrangements

52. The current cost-sharing arrangements were approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 56/255, under the terms of which the United Nations field security management system would assume collective responsibility for the safety

and security of its staff. Field-related costs, which are incurred either in the field or at headquarters locations through the provision of operational support, are to be shared based on the number of staff of participating organizations. Central costs related to the management and direction of the United Nations field security management system are borne by the United Nations. The Inter-agency Security Management Network, at its meeting held in Vienna in May 2006, discussed the cost-sharing arrangements. The Network recalled the basis upon which the cost-sharing arrangements were agreed in 2001, for example, field-related costs would be apportioned among participating organizations.

53. As indicated in the report of the Secretary-General (A/59/365, paras. 61-62), experience has shown practical problems and difficulties in implementing the cost-sharing arrangements. Among other problems, a number of organizations have experienced difficulty in forecasting and budgeting accurately for their cost-shared portion of the budget of the Department of Safety and Security. One organization (the World Bank) has stated that it disagrees with the cost-sharing formula and has withheld its contribution of $11 million. All other agencies, funds and programmes have stated that they have no additional funds to absorb the potential shortfalls. As a result, the Department could face a significant shortfall in its funding, which would have a fundamental impact on its ability to operate in the areas of regional field operation coordination and field support.

# IV. Conclusions and recommendations

54. **The preceding overview of the activities of the Department of Safety and Security over the last 18 months points to significant achievements as well as major remaining challenges. While building on the former, the latter must be addressed through systematic action in several areas. The support of Member States and the cooperation of the entire United Nations system are crucial in achieving this. In particular, the United Nations security management system would benefit from even closer cooperation with host countries. A coordinated approach to issues of staff security and consistency on the part of Member States is also needed with regard to their representation in the different intergovernmental forums.**

55. **For its part, the Department of Safety and Security, in addition to improving its staffing levels, training, executive direction and management, coordination and responsiveness to ongoing emergencies, will also strive to achieve the long-term goals of: making security considerations an integral part of the United Nations-system planning and budget processes from the very start, at Headquarters and in the field; improving understanding and cooperation with host-country authorities; and improving interaction and integration with the security elements of agencies, funds and programmes in order to ensure the best utilization of human and material resources in a coherent way for the system as a whole. The continued support of the General Assembly, through a strong resolution and follow-up collectively and individually by its Members, is a sine qua non for achieving those goals.**

56. **The General Assembly may wish:**

(a) **To approve the reclassification of the existing D-2 Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General post to the Assistant Secretary-General-level and to**

**authorize the Secretary-General to report the related costs of $33,400 under section 33, Safety and security, and $6,800 under section 35, Staff assessment, to be offset by an equivalent amount under income section 1, Income from staff assessment, in the context of the second budget performance report for the biennium 2006-2007;**

**(b) To also approve the maintenance and continuation of the D-2 position of Director, Headquarters Security and Safety Service;**

**(c) To authorize the conversion of the 134 temporary posts to established posts in the Security and Safety Services;**

**(d) To endorse the establishment of a United Nations crisis management capability and to revert to the ongoing requirements in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009.**

# Annex I

## Inter-organizational security measures: framework for accountability for the United Nations security management system

## I. Introduction

1. The primary responsibility for the security and protection of personnel employed by the United Nations-system organizations, their spouse and other recognized dependants and property and of the organizations' property rests with the host Government. This responsibility flows from every Government's normal and inherent function of maintaining order and protecting persons and property within its jurisdiction. In the case of international organizations and their officials, the Government is considered to have a special responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations or the Government's agreements with the individual organizations.

## II. Mission statement of the United Nations security management system

2. The goal of the United Nations security management system is to enable the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the security, safety and well-being of staff as a high priority.

## III. Actors within the United Nations security management system

### A. Secretary-General

3. Under Article 97 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer of the Organization; the mandates promulgated by the principal organs are entrusted to him for their implementation under Article 98. The Secretary-General is thus accountable to the Member States for the proper running and administration of the Organization and implementation of its programmes to include, in the context of this framework, ensuring the overall safety and security of United Nations personnel at headquarters locations and in the field, as well as United Nations premises and assets at headquarters and field locations. The Secretary-General can delegate authority to the various Under-Secretaries-General who are in turn, individually or collectively, accountable to him, as appropriate.

### B. Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security

4. The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security is directly accountable and reports to the Secretary-General. He/she is responsible for the executive direction and control of the United Nations security management system and the overall safety and security of United Nations civilian personnel and their recognized

dependants at both headquarters locations and in the field, as well as United Nations premises and assets at field and headquarters locations. He/she represents the Secretary-General on all security-related matters. He/she is responsible for developing security policies, practices and procedures for United Nations-system personnel worldwide, and coordinating with the organizations of the United Nations system to ensure implementation, compliance and support for security aspects of their activities; preparing reports of the Secretary-General on all security-related matters; and advising the Secretary-General on all matters related to security and safety of civilian personnel of the United Nations system.

## C. Executive heads of United Nations-system organizations[1]

5. Executive heads of the United Nations funds and programmes are responsible and accountable to the Secretary-General for ensuring that the goal of the United Nations security management system is met within their respective organizations. Without prejudice to their accountability to their own governing and legislative bodies, executive heads of the United Nations specialized agencies and of other organizations participating in the United Nations security management system recognize the coordinating role and authority of the Secretary-General in matters related to safety and security of United Nations personnel and commit themselves to ensuring that the goal of the United Nations security management system is met.

## D. Senior security managers and/or headquarters security focal points

6. The executive heads will appoint a senior security manager and/or headquarters security focal point to be responsible for coordinating the organization's day-to-day response to safety and security and providing all the relevant actors with advice, guidance and technical assistance.

## E. Designated officials

7. In each country or designated area where the United Nations is present, the most senior official is normally appointed as the designated official for security. The designated official is accountable to the Secretary-General, through the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, for the security of personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants throughout the country or designated area. The designated official is responsible and accountable for ensuring that the goal of the United Nations security management system is met at the duty station.

[1] The term "organizations" includes: the major organizational units of the Secretariat that have heads officially accountable to the Secretary-General; other bodies subsidiary or related to the United Nations, such as the United Nations funds, agencies and programmes; and organizations participating in the United Nations security management system.

## F. Representatives of organizations participating in the United Nations security management system

8. Representatives of organizations (the "country representative", "agency head" or "head of mission") of the United Nations system participating in the United Nations security management system are accountable to the Secretary-General through their respective executive heads, under the overall guidance of the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, for all matters related to the security of their personnel at the duty station.

## G. Security management team

9. The security management team shall normally consist of the designated official, who acts as chair, the head of each United Nations organization present at the duty station and the chief security adviser. The security management team advises the designated official on all security-related matters. In peacekeeping missions, where the head of mission serves as the designated official, the security management team may also include heads of offices or sections, as specified by the designated official. members of the security management team have a collective responsibility to support the designated official in the discharge of his/her mandate related to the safety and security of all personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants.

## H. Area security coordinators

10. Area security coordinators are staff members appointed in writing by the designated official, in consultation with the security management team, in areas of larger countries that are separated from the capital in terms of both distance and exposure, in order to coordinate and control security arrangements applicable to all personnel employed by organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants in their area of responsibility. Area security coordinators are accountable to the designated official for their security-related responsibilities, in accordance with their respective letters of appointment.

## I. Chief security adviser/security adviser

11. The chief security adviser/security adviser is a security professional appointed by the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security to advise the designated official and the security management team in their security functions. The chief security adviser/security adviser reports to the designated official and maintains a technical line of communication to the Department of Safety and Security. In the absence of a chief security adviser/security adviser, the designated official, in consultation with the Department of Safety and Security, should appoint a country security focal point for the security management team.

## J. Country security focal point (if applicable)

12. In the absence of a chief security adviser/security adviser, the designated official, in consultation with the Department of Safety and Security and the staff member's employing organization, will appoint an international staff member to act as country security focal point for the security management team. Country security focal points are accountable to the designated official for the security-related responsibilities, in accordance with their respective letters of appointment.

## K. Other security personnel of the Department of Safety and Security

13. Security personnel of the Department of Safety and Security are responsible for assisting the chief security adviser and the designated official, and are accountable to their respective heads of office.

## L. Single-agency security officers

14. Single-agency security officers are security professionals hired by organizations of the United Nations security management system to advise their respective organizations and to be responsible for the security aspects of activities that are specific to their organizations. Single-agency security officers report to their agency's head of office, while at the same time supporting the designated official under the coordination of the chief security adviser.

15. When required to act as the chief security adviser ad interim for a specified period, in the absence of the chief security adviser for a given duty station, this will be confirmed in writing by the designated official and include the terms of reference of the chief security adviser for accountability purposes.

## M. Wardens

16. Wardens are appointed in writing by the designated official, in consultation with the security management team, to ensure proper implementation of the security plan in a predetermined zone of a large city. Wardens are accountable to the designated official/area security coordinator for their security-related functions, irrespective of their employing organization.

## N. Personnel employed by organizations of the United Nations system

17. Personnel employed by organizations of the United Nations system are accountable to their respective organizations. All such personnel have the responsibility to abide by security policies, guidelines, directives, plans and procedures of the United Nations security management system and their organizations.

# IV. Conclusion

18. This framework for accountability provides clear guidance as to how to enable "the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities, while ensuring the safety, security and well-being of staff as a high priority". This goal may be attained by ensuring that all actors of the United Nations security management system are empowered by providing them with the necessary resources, training and a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities.

# Annex II

## Organization chart: Department of Safety and Security*




**Abbreviations*: ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; USG, Under-Secretary-General; GS (OL, PL), General Service (Other level, Principal level); LL, Local level; SS, Security Service; RB, regular budget; XB, extrabudgetary.

[a]Proposed for reclassification to ASG.

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**General and complete disarmament**

# Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities

## Report of the Secretary-General

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# I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 1 of its resolution 60/66, the General Assembly invited all Member States to inform the Secretary-General of their views on the advisability of further developing international outer space transparency and confidence-building measures in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

2. On 13 June 2006, a note verbale was sent to all Member States drawing their attention to paragraph 1 of resolution 60/66 and seeking their views on the matter. The replies received from Canada, China, Cuba, Iraq, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia and the Russian Federation are reproduced in section II below. Any replies subsequently received from other Member States will be issued as addenda to the present report.

# II. Replies received from Governments

## Canada

[Original: English]
[17 October 2006]

Canada commends the Russian Federation for its initiative in bringing forward General Assembly resolution 60/66 on transparency and confidence-building measures (CBMs) in outer space, and for encouraging a dialogue on this important issue.

Next year will mark the 40th anniversary of the opening for signature of the *Outer Space Treaty* (OST), as well as the 50th anniversary of the launch of SPUTNIK. Discussion of these issues is therefore timely.

Space is a global resource, and is increasingly part of our collective critical infrastructure — from global communication and navigation links to the collection of environmental and natural resource management information. Activities in outer space encompass civil, military and increasingly commercial endeavours that are all consistent with the peaceful uses of outer pace. The exploration, exploitation and sustainable use of outer space should continue to be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all States. As the *Outer Space Treaty* makes clear, outer space "shall be the province of all mankind".

In order to protect this resource upon which we all increasingly rely, Canada supports the examination of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space as a complement to existing pursuits within the Conference on Disarmament and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Transparency and confidence-building measures can contribute to reduce threat perceptions and help to build trust among nations. They also can facilitate increased international cooperation in outer space among States and thus serve to promote international peace and security.

This paper describes some of the kinds of transparency an confidence-building measures that exist already in international law or in other commitments undertaken by States relating to outer space — or that could potentially have an application to

outer space. While the list is not by any means exhaustive, it nevertheless could assist Member States in their consideration and general discussion of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space.

**Using existing instruments to the full**

A number of tools related to transparency and confidence-building measures are already at our disposal. For example, the overall body of existing space law provides an important contribution to building confidence among space actors. States could therefore make the fullest use of provisions available in existing agreements and arrangements.

Transparency and confidence-building measures are some of the key elements of the *Outer Space Treaty (1967)*. For example, Article IX (consultations concerning proposed activities or experiments in space), Article X ("the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States"), Article XI (regarding information sharing), and Article XII (reciprocal access to "all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies").

Transparency and confidence-building measures are also an integral part of the *Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation* (HCOC). In addition to promoting further voluntary bilateral or regional steps, transparency measures available under the HCOC include:

- Annual declarations outlining Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) policies and launch sites, as well as the number and generic class of SLVs launched during the previous year;
- Pre-launch notification for SLVs and Ballistic Missiles; and
- Extending invitations to international observers to witness launches.

Canada calls on all Member States of the United Nations to subscribe to the HCOC and to fully implement its provisions.

The *Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space* (1975) established a mandatory and uniform registration system for objects launched into outer space. The Convention requires mandatory reporting to the United Nations Secretary-General on issues such as the date and location of the launch, basic orbital parameters after launch, and the recovery date of the spacecraft. Work is currently under way in the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee to review the registration practices of States and international organizations and to adopt a set of best practices/guidelines for registration, including on the types of information to be provided. It is expected that this work will enhance the quality of information provided pursuant to the Convention.

A significant amount of information relating to trends and annual developments related to space is available by researching open sources. The provision of neutral and evidence-based analysis of this information can serve to augment transparency and confidence. In this connection, the *Space Security Index*, developed by the research consortium spacesecurity.org, is an important tool for transparency and awareness building.

**Enhancing transparency and confidence-building measures**

In addition to ongoing work in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), there are a number of other confidence-building and transparency measures relating to activities in outer space that could be examined for their potential contribution to enhancing international peace and security:

- *Debris mitigation*. In March 2006 the COPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee received from its Space Debris Working Group draft guidelines aimed at reducing the production of harmful debris in outer space. The draft guidelines, based on work by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), were approved for referral to member States for their consent and onward transmission to the COPUOS 2007 Plenary. It is hoped that the guidelines will be adopted at UNGA 62 (Fourth Committee) in 2007.

- The successful negotiation of voluntary guidelines for the mitigation of space debris will help increase the understanding of other space actors' activities in space and thus enhance the sustainable use of outer space in the face of a growing environmental problem. Once adopted, States will be encouraged to voluntarily take measures, through national or other mechanisms — including through national legislation, as appropriate — to ensure that the guidelines are implemented.

- *Space traffic management*. Guidelines to improve space traffic management could also be considered. Such measures could possibly include, inter alia, more detailed pre-launch notifications, notification of orbital change and other manoeuvres that could result in close approaches to other space objects, and a pre-atmospheric re-entry notification regime. Enhanced data sharing on natural space environmental conditions, as well as an improved information-sharing and consultation procedures for collisions, interference and other incidents in space, could also serve to enhance international peace and security. Member States may wish to consider the contribution to space security by a rules-based behaviour regime that defined acceptable conduct by all space-faring States and thus provide confidence through predictability.

- *Moratorium on anti-satellite weapons tests*. The cessation of tests of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons by the United States and Soviet Union in the 1980s is an important example of voluntary restraint, and a significant confidence-building measure. Other space-faring States could observe similar moratoria.

*Improved space object characterizations*: States that register space objects in accordance with the *Registration Convention* could give serious consideration to declaring additional information concerning, inter alia, the manoeuvrability and effective irradiated power capabilities of newly registered space objects. This issue could also be considered by the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee in the context of its review of registration practices. Additional information could assist other registrants in computing a harm index that would assess the ability of the newly registered space objects to interfere, damage or destroy other space objects by contact or at a stand-off range.

*Low technology cooperative launch monitoring*: Space launch vehicles and ballistic missiles generate a considerable amount of noise when they are launched. Exploiting a resurgence of scientific interest in infrasound technology, similar to

that being employed by the provisional Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, might offer the international community a means to declare and demonstrate compliance with an improved, universal pre-launch notification regime for space launch vehicles and ballistic missiles.

Participation in the cooperative monitoring of the launch events of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles could help all States gain insight into the intent and capabilities of those States with active rocket programmes. Collective monitoring could therefore help all States combat ballistic missile proliferation by filling knowledge gaps that could otherwise fuel horizontal and vertical ballistic missile arms races.

*Ground-based space surveillance*: In 1989, France proposed the creation of a space surveillance system, consisting of radar and optical sensors, for the international community to track the trajectory of space objects. This was presented in the Conference on Disarmament (CD/937 and CD/PV.570) and evolved into a proposal to establish an international trajectography centre (UNITRACE).

Given the rapid advances in technology, and easier access to high-quality open source information, the UNITRACE proposal could be revisited and updated. Such an initiative could complement the US-Russian agreement to establish a Joint Early Warning and Data Interpretation Centre and would be consistent with that agreement's envisaged multilateralization. It could also have benefits for commercial satellite operators in terms of providing information to de-conflict satellite launches and close approach orbital trajectories. It would also reinforce the Registration and Liability Conventions.

## China

[Original: Chinese]
[18 August 2006]

China supports resolution 60/66, "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities", adopted at the sixtieth session of the General Assembly. China has consistently opposed the weaponization of outer space and an arms race in outer space, and is of the view that international legal instruments, arrived at through negotiation and having the binding force of law, are the most effective way to prevent the weaponization of outer space and an arms race in outer space. Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space are transitional steps and a beneficial supplement in the attainment of that goal. At the same time, China is of the view that the most important, practical and realistic outer space confidence-building measures are to refrain from placing weapons in outer space or using or threatening to use military force in outer space. China and the Russian Federation have submitted to the Conference on Disarmament a series of documents, including document CD/1778, "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities and the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space", in which the foregoing position is fully set forth.

## Cuba

[Original: Spanish]
[5 September 2006]

Cuba fully supports General Assembly resolution 60/66, "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities".

An arms race in outer space would pose a serious threat to international peace and security.

The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, should be for strictly peaceful means and for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development.

The space age, begun almost 50 years ago, has been characterized by rapid development in space technology and by growing concern about the dangers inherent to an arms race in outer space.

The General Assembly officially recognized these concerns in the 1978 Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and requested that new measures be adopted and international negotiations be held on the issue.

New measures should be examined in the search for agreements to prevent the weaponization of, and an arms race in, outer space.

Given the lack of complete arrangements to prevent an arms race in outer space, it is vital to develop confidence-building measures.

Cuba considers it appropriate and necessary to continue developing international transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities in order to maintain international peace and security, promote international cooperation and prevent an arms race in outer space.

The objectives of such measures should be to achieve greater transparency and predictability in space activities in general, through such measures as prior notification, verification and follow-up, thereby contributing to international security.

The various space capabilities of the Member States should be taken into account when studying possible confidence-building measures in outer space.

An important confidence-building measure would be strict respect for the existing agreements on arms limitation and the disarmament of outer space, including bilateral agreements, as well as for the existing legal regime on the use of outer space.

The General Assembly of the United Nations has, in many resolutions supported by Cuba, reaffirmed the importance of confidence-building measures as a means of preventing an arms race in outer space.

General Assembly resolution 60/54, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", which Cuba also fully supports, reaffirms the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and the readiness of all States to contribute to that common objective, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on

Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

All States, in particular those with major space capabilities, should refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation.

Cuba believes that the Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

The right of all States to explore and use outer space for the benefit and in the interest of all humanity is a universally accepted legal principle.

In the foreseeable future, achieving full autonomy of space capabilities by all States is neither technologically nor economically viable.

Therefore, as the number of States participating in space activities increases, so does the urgency for greater bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Cooperation is an important means of safeguarding outer space for peaceful uses and of ensuring that the benefits of space technology reach all States.

## Iraq

[Original: Arabic]
[12 July 2006]

Iraq continues to be of the opinion that it is advisable to further develop international outer space transparency and confidence-building measures in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Iraq also continues to believe that the study by governmental experts on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space (A/48/305) contains many ideas and proposals whose adoption and development consistent with scientific and technical progress would promote confidence-building measures and lead to greater international cooperation for the benefit of humankind and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This might require the formulation of new internationally accepted legal instruments and principles.

## Japan

[Original: English]
[14 September 2006]

Japan's overall guideline on Space Environment Utilization is embodied in "the Basic Strategy for Space Development and Utilization" which was decided upon by the Council for Science and Technology Policy in September 2004. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) is proceeding with research and development activities through the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) based on the "Long Term Program for Space Activities" adopted by the Space Activities Commission in March 2003.

Under the above-mentioned strategy and plan, Japan makes utmost efforts to increase transparency in Space Environment Utilization activities through such measures as the provision of information to the general public via the Internet and mass media, as well as holding seminars and symposiums for experts and researchers in this field.

Regarding plans for upcoming satellite launches by Japan, transparency is ensured through the publication in the annual White Paper on Science and Technology.

In the area of multilateral cooperation, Japan is actively engaged in the promotion of cooperation through the activities of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) hosted by Japan in order to exchange opinions about the international cooperation in space development in the Asia-Pacific region, and the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS), which carries out technical coordination and information exchange on earth observation satellite systems. In particular, Japan is endeavouring to establish a system for disaster prevention and crisis management in the Asia-Pacific region. This will allow for the provision and sharing of disaster prevention information among relevant regional States through coordination among space agencies and disaster institutions in the region. Japan is also participating in the International Space Stations (ISS) programme, the largest international cooperation project for space development. Japan closely cooperates with all participating nations in the construction and utilization of the ISS.

In the area of bilateral cooperation, space activities between Japan and the United States are proceeding smoothly under the "Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning Cross-Waiver of the Liability for Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Space for Peaceful Purposes". For cooperation with European countries, a close relationship with the European Space Agency (ESA) is maintained through administrative Japan-ESA meetings on an almost annual basis. Moreover, regarding cooperation with Russia, the space cooperation joint meeting is held regularly to promote bilateral cooperation.

Japan believes that these multilateral and bilateral efforts play an important role as measures to increase transparency and promote confidence-building among the countries involved in the area of space environment utilization.

## Mexico

[Original: Spanish]
[19 September 2006]

Mexico attaches particular importance to the efforts of the international community to prevent an arms race in outer space and promote international cooperation to ensure that outer space is used for peaceful purposes. It considers it very worthwhile in this context to adopt transparency and confidence-building measures, particularly among States with advanced space technologies.

The 1993 study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space provided a broad overview of such measures, stressing the importance of reliability, security, openness and predictability in defining them. It should however

be borne in mind that, while the aforementioned study offers a valuable benchmark for discussing this topic, since that time the international context has changed and technology has advanced substantially. A fresh evaluation containing specific recommendations would therefore be highly useful in providing a basis for taking effective steps to foster a cooperative climate of trust.

Mexico urges States members of the Conference on Disarmament to seek agreement on this matter and to remove the risk of an arms race in outer space, stressing that it shares the concern of several countries about the threats hanging over this common heritage of humanity. Mexico hopes that other States with space capabilities will pledge that they will not be the first to deploy any type of arms in outer space.

Mexico emphasizes that transparency and confidence-building measures should be strengthened in this field, taking into account that such measures complement and contribute to disarmament and arms-limitation agreements and are conducive to improved information-sharing among States, which thereby reduce and may even manage to eliminate possible perceptions of risks to their safety.

Mexico reaffirms that the exploration and use of outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies should serve exclusively peaceful purposes and benefit all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, without jeopardizing the safety of any State, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Within this framework, confidence-building measures contribute to the development and adoption of commitments that will preserve outer space from an arms race.

## Mongolia

[Original: English]
[21 August 2006]

Mongolia views that outer space, being the common heritage of mankind, should be explored and used solely for peace purposes to the benefit of all nations. It supports initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and threat or use of force against space objects through adopting a relevant legally binding instrument.

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 60/66, "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities", Mongolia would like to inform that it *fully supports further developing such transparency and confidence-building measures in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation*.

## Russian Federation

[Original: Russian]
[19 April 2006]

With reference to the invitation to all States Members of the United Nations contained in General Assembly resolution 60/66, entitled "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities", the Russian Federation hereby conveys to the Secretary-General its views on the advisability of further developing such measures.

The Russian Federation considers that the world has already acknowledged that transparency and confidence-building measures are a significant component of international law. This situation has been reflected in a number of General Assembly resolutions confirming "the importance of confidence-building measures as a conducive means of ensuring the attainment of the objective of the prevention of an arms race in outer space" and recognizing that "concrete proposals on confidence-building measures could form an integral part" of the relevant international agreements.

Transparency and confidence-building measures are already used in one form or another in several international outer-space agreements. Many such measures are applied by States on their own initiative. However, they are not at present all-embracing in terms either of their coverage of the various types of outer space activity or of the participation of States in their implementation.

The advisability of further developing measures of this kind depends on their expected contribution to promoting the cause of peace, security, international cooperation and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Transparency and confidence-building measures reduce the risk of a mistaken perception and assessment of another State's military activity in outer space. Although they cannot replace measures for the legal regulation of various armaments in outer space or act as a substitute for monitoring arrangements, they do have the capacity to create the conditions for the formulation of the corresponding legal obligations. The production of recommendations on possible measures of this kind is a simple first step in the direction of strengthening security in outer space. Success in this regard would facilitate agreement on the next steps. Joint work on transparency and confidence-building measures would help to enhance understanding of States' intentions and the situation in outer space. Predictability of the military activities of States in outer space would substantially reduce the likelihood of the emergence of sudden military threats in or from outer space and uncertainty with regard to the strategic situation in outer space and, consequently, the need for States to make early preparations to neutralize such threats. Such measures could thus constitute a transitional stage in the formulation of new international legal agreements on outer space providing for the maintenance of outer space as a zone free of weapons of any kind.

In the light of these considerations the Russian Federation believes it advisable further to develop international outer-space transparency and confidence-building measures.

United Nations A/61/533

General Assembly

Distr.: General
23 October 2006

Original: English

**Sixty-first session**
Agenda item 44
**Culture of peace**

## Identical letters dated 16 October 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour to respectfully request the circulation of the concluding summary of the high-level Conference on Interfaith Cooperation towards Peace as a document of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44 (see annex).

(*Signed*) Lauro L. **Baja, Jr.**
Permanent Representative

06-58263 (E) 271006

**Annex to the identical letters dated 16 October 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly**

**HIGH LEVEL CONFERENCE ON INTERFAITH COOPERATION FOR PEACE***

## MODERATOR'S CONCLUDING SUMMARY

**Dr. Katherine Marshall**
Chief Moderator

Today marked the formal launch of the first major project of the Tripartite Forum on Interfaith Cooperation for Peace, and involved inspirational speeches and wise comments from global and UN leaders and the wide range of participants, from member states, from United Nations agencies, and from many Religious bodies and NGOs. My colleagues as moderators, Sister Joan Kirby and Stein Villumstad, have highlighted some key points. My summary briefly reviews what we have achieved, in the form of a stock-taking, starting from a set of fundamental questions about when, how much, why, where, who, what, and how.

Many thanks to all who devoted extraordinary efforts to bringing this idea to its current stage, and especially the Phillipine Government and His Excellency Minister Alberto G. Romulo. We are all grateful for the initiative and hard work, behind and in front of the scenes that made today possible and assured its smooth running. Their work is evidence that they have had this day an initiative close to their hearts.

My thanks to my wonderful co-moderators. They gave brief summaries of their leading conclusions. Sister Joan Kirby highlighted her sense of a deep commitment to action, going beyond dialogue in itself. In sum, the goal of dialogue, whether interfaith or among the agencies represented here, must be geared to action and must be one that entails both giving and receiving. Stein Villumstad emphasized the multiple roles and goals of interfaith dialogue, to promote understanding: between: faiths and different elements of cultures, between faiths and governments, and among religions and multinational institutions. Such dialogue on all fronts is not an option: it is a must.

My sense was that we emerged from this day with strong consensus on a number of fundamental points, and several themes were echoed by all parts of the tripartite group. On several other areas the consensus was less clear and calls us to further work, dialogue and reflection.

**Organized by the Tripartite Forum on Interfaith Cooperation For Peace, United Nations Conference Room 3, September 21, 2006. Other details of the Conference can be gleaned on www.tripartiteinterfaithforum.org.*

***Areas of Consensus***:

*When?* There was a strong theme throughout the day's discussion that the initiative to launch the High Level Tripartite Forum initiative is not only timely but urgently needed. Speaker after speaker echoed this sense of a critical moment when action and dialogue are needed.

*How Much?* Much more, was the common answer to questions about interfaith engagement and action within the United Nations system. There was a sense that there is far too little engagement and understanding and that far more is needed.

*Why?* In many forms, the speakers today affirmed that current debates and structures involve faith institutions and leaders far too little, yet they are critical to the goals of peace and human security. This gap in understanding and dialogue contributes both to poor understanding of issues involving religion that have enormous global and geopolitical significance and a wide range of missed opportunities to contribute to peace-making and building and to development. The complex intersections of religion and violence were the subject of much reflection, and there were strong voices that highlighted the importance of religious actors in peace building and peace-making, as well as conflict prevention.

The central role of the millennium development goals (MDGs) was stressed as an organizing framework. I was concerned through the first part of the day to hear so little focus on poverty and the MDGs but this came out more strongly in the latter interventions. There was less specific focus on religious institution roles in development but a recognition that this is a central topic that needs much more attention.

There was also a widely shared sense that discussion of underlying values, which is a central concern of religious institutions but also of each and every party present, is sorely needed. Bringing values into United Nations discussions at every level was seen as appropriate and necessary.

*Where?* The location of the Forum within the United Nations was considered by speakers as appropriate.

***Areas of Concern and Areas for Reflection***

*Who?* There was less clarity in the discussion about who should be involved, on all sides of this tripartite coalition. The notion of a tripartite structure which involves a carefully balanced participation by the three broad groups involved (Member States, UN agencies, and Religious agencies and NGOs) seemed sound, sensible, and generally workable. However, there remain some issues on who should be involved at various levels. At one level the hope was expressed that a wider range of institutions, especially member states, could become involved. Yet there was also recognition that these are wide universes and engaging all who might have interest in this wide forum poses practical challenges.

Several interventions focused on the important roles of women and youth in bridging divides among the tripartite partners, but there was less sense of how this could be achieved and this remains an area for future attention and action.

*How?* Many questions were raised as to how the Tripartite Forum could and should function at various levels, from its overall structure to the nature of discussions and debates. The pattern that was followed today, of rotating interventions by representatives of member states, UN agencies, and Religious NGOs, assured a good balance and many voices were heard, but it did not encourage

active interaction and dialogue. Different formats including smaller issue focused discussions suggested by various speakers. The importance of action at the grass roots as well as at a g level was stressed many times so the issue is how to pursue these different strands and bring together. There was a good suggestion to pursue a suggestion to organize hearings on inter cooperation within the framework of the General Assembly. Follow up in conjunction of the re on the Alliance of Civilizations commission could be envisaged.

There was a widespread concern that the focus of the Forum should be on action, not on w and speeches, but much less clarity on what that might involve. I was personally some concerned about the expression of some skepticism about the merits of dialogue, as true dial that seeks understanding and transformation would seem a critical part of this process. Bu desire to promote effective action echoed strongly and was welcomed by us all. The importan many and creative partnerships was widely highlighted but again it was somewhat less clear the Forum can and should work to promote them. The importance of communication was w stressed and is an area where further discussion and action was recommended.

*What?* Many posed questions about the focus of issues that the Tripartite Forum sh address. The questions of peace were central to the conception of the Forum and remain heart, but the next question is how this group can contribute to peace-making and peace bui at a practical level. Likewise there was a sense that the intersections of the various men present is critical for attainment of the MDGs but it was less clear exactly how this migh achieved. There were glimmers of practical ideas and themes in both areas, notably in a const recurring focus on education. But a critical next stage will evidently involve the developme agendas where this Forum is particularly well positioned to being its voice and advance dialogue

***The Path Forward***

The organizers have committed themselves to take stock of today's discussion and to r back to those who attended today's conference.

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General Assembly

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23 October 2006

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Sixty-first session
Agenda items 7 and 11

**Organization of work, adoption of the agenda and allocation of items: reports of the General Committee**

**Prevention of armed conflict**

# Identical letters dated 3 October 2006 from the Permanent Representatives of Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Gambia, Honduras, Malawi, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Nicaragua, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Swaziland and Tuvalu to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly

We respectfully demand a legal opinion be sought and given over serious violations of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

On 12 September 2006, the matter came before the General Committee with regard to two proposals that were co-sponsored by the undersigned. These proposals were listed under item 41, "A proactive role for the United Nations in maintaining peace and security in East Asia", and item 155, "Question of the representation and participation of the 23 million people of Taiwan in the United Nations" of the draft agenda (see A/BUR/61/1). Contrary to rules 40, 41 and 43 of the rules of procedure, the General Committee chose to amalgamate these quite distinct proposals into one item and to arbitrarily limit the number of speakers — a clear violation of the rules of procedure.[1]

In our view, this decision is unfair, irregular and inappropriate because it is contrary to the provisions and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

[1] Rule 40 states that the General Committee "shall make recommendations to the General Assembly, with regard to each item proposed ...". Rule 41 states that the General Committee "shall not, however, decide any political question." The amalgamation of these two proposals prevented their consideration on their own independent merits, in violation of rule 40.

Rule 43 states: "A member of the General Assembly which has no representative on the General Committee and which has requested the inclusion of an item in the agenda shall be entitled to attend any meeting of the General Committee at which its request is discussed and may participate, without vote, in the discussion of that item."

06-58328 (E) 301006

The amalgamation constituted a political judgement, without transparency, of two entirely distinct issues. The question of the representation of Taiwan entails an analysis of a body of law and precedent which is entirely distinct from the question raised by the proposal for a proactive role for the United Nations in maintaining peace and security in East Asia. The proposals call for distinct remedies and actions by the United Nations. There is simply nothing about them to justify their amalgamation. The sovereign countries which proposed these two proposals insist upon their separate consideration.

We were ready, willing and able to engage in a full and fair debate before the General Committee on the inclusion of both of these important items. Rule 43 of the rules of procedure certainly gives us the right to do so. Clearly, we are members requesting inclusion of an item and were prevented from participating in the discussion of the item.

In any event, this decision has no precedent in the history of the United Nations. Our suspicion is that it was undertaken simply because it involves the matter of Taiwan and China. That is not a good excuse to create such a bad precedent.

We most strongly protest these political manoeuvres and we observe that for the world's only universal deliberative body to inappropriately apply its own procedures is a violation of some of the most strongly held ideals of our Organization.

The Member States who co-sponsored the proposals have the same rights as any other Member State to present both procedural and substantive matters to the United Nations, including this one. Silenced by these unlawful tactics at the General Committee, we wish to make it clear that we will not be silenced forever. We require a legal opinion to confirm the views set out above and we require it on an expedited basis, so that we may engage in the debate to which we are entitled, either in a reconvened debate of the General Committee, or during the sixty-first General Assembly.

Once you have passed this matter to the legal office, may we kindly request a meeting with the Legal Counsel to discuss it in depth.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter could be circulated as a document of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly.

(*Signed*) Michel **Kafando**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Burkina Faso to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Carmen Maria **Gallardo Hernández**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of El Salvador to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Crispin **Grey-Johnson**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Gambia to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Ivan **Romero-Martinez**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Honduras to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Brown Beswick **Chimphamba**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Malawi to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Alfred **Capelle**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Republic
of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Marlene **Moses**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Nauru to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Eduardo J. **Sevilla Somoza**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Nicaragua to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Stuart **Beck**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Palau to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Joseph **Christmas**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Saint Kitts and Nevis to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Margaret Hughes **Ferrari**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Domingos Augusto **Ferreira**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of Sao Tome and Principe to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Collin D. **Beck**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Solomon Islands to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Petunia Lindiwe **Mndebele**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Swaziland to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Enele Sosene **Sopoaga**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Tuvalu to the United Nations


06-58328

United Nations A/61/535

General Assembly

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**Sixty-first session**
Agenda item 8
**General debate**

## Letter dated 4 October 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the written statement of the delegation of the United Kingdom in exercise of the right of reply to the remarks made by His Excellency Néstor Carlos Kirchner, President of the Argentine Republic, on 20 September 2006 in the General Assembly (see annex).

I should be most grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and the attached statement circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 8.

(*Signed*) Emyr Jones **Parry**

06-58269 (E) 231006

## Annex to the letter dated 4 October 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

## Statement of the delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in exercise of the right of reply to the remarks made by the President of the Argentine Republic in the general debate on 20 September 2006

The British Government attaches great importance to the principle of self-determination as set out in Article 1.2 of the Charter of the United Nations and article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. That principle underlies our position on the Falkland Islands.

The elected representatives of the Falkland Islands once again expressed their own views clearly when they visited the United Nations for this year's debate in the Committee of 24. They asked the Committee to recognize that they, like any other people, were entitled to exercise the right of self-determination. They reiterated that the people of the Falkland Islands did not wish for any change in the status of the Islands.

There can be no negotiations on the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands unless and until such time as the islanders so wish.

The United Kingdom has no doubts about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.

United Nations A/61/536

General Assembly

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23 October 2006

Original: English

**Sixty-first session**
Agenda item 27
**Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development**

## Letter dated 23 October 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit the statement of Gela Bezhuashvili, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, dated 21 October 2006 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 27.

(*Signed*) Irakli **Alasania**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

06-58703 (E) 301006

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

**Annex to the letter dated 23 October 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addresssed to the Secretary-General**

## Statement of Gela Bezhuashvili, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia

Good evening ladies and gentlemen - and thank you for coming at such a late hour.

Although it is very late I feel it is necessary to gather all of you together tonight because of the statements made some minutes ago by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin at the Lahti Summit.

Let me be very clear, I am very alarmed by the deliberate and gross misrepresentation of the facts by the Russian President. And quite frankly, I would never have expected that the President of such a great country would respond in such a clearly inaccurate manner - and would directly insult the intelligence of his European colleagues.

Tonight I want to talk about facts and I want to talk about principles.

Specifically, President Putin deliberately misrepresented facts about the nature of the current tensions between Russia and Georgia - and specifically about the nature of the territorial conflicts in Georgia. The issues we are here to address are democracy and values - both of which are flourishing in Georgia. And both of which are under grave threat in Russia today.

This is not simply a question of Russian-Georgian relations as the President of the Russian Federation would have it. This is about a clash of values. And Mr. Putin is using Georgia as a pretext to evade this simple fact. It is a clash between European values and practices and those that are practiced in Russia today. In doing so he has chosen to misrepresent the facts - and I am here to correct them for you.

Deliberate Inaccuracy Number One: Never in history has there been a genocide against the people of South Ossetia. The leadership of Russia would appear to be reassembling facts and history to suit their own versions and interests. This is deeply troubling.

Deliberate Inaccuracy Number Two: In the case of Abkhazia, ethnic cleansing was conducted there. And it was conducted against 500,000 people with troops that were armed and supported and sponsored by the Russian Federation - and this included more than 280,000 ethnic Georgians. None of these people are allowed back to their homes due to the presence of Russian troops who do not allow them to return. Rather, many of these people found refuge in Russia and it is these very people who are now being ethnically targeted, forcibly put on airplanes and sent out of their homes. I find it very profoundly disturbing that the Russian President had no words of sympathy for these people - for which many people in Russia-proper have branded as a new pogrom - and who now find themselves uprooted for a second time.

Deliberate Inaccuracy Number Three: The Government of Georgia and the people of

Georgia have no intention to use force against its citizens – as repeatedly stated. This is a pure fiction, and the Russian President knows this but chooses to presume that the international community is ignorant. Thankfully you all know better. There is a Peace Plan that has been created by my government and approved by the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and many other governments around the world. This is the basis for our vision and the central foundation for this is the territorial integrity of Georgia. This is the universally endorsed fact.

In spite of the Russian President's deliberate misrepresentation of the facts, we draw your attention to:

1. 15 years after the demise of the Soviet Union, we are still dealing with the legacy of propaganda and disinformation.

2. The deterioration that has been mentioned by President Putin did not begin when we expelled Russian saboteurs a few weeks ago. It began when we started down the path of developing a sound and predictable democracy.

3. At the same time we once again welcome the Russian President's expression of interest in re-establishing a dialogue between Russia and Georgia.

On the subject of fact and disinformation – for many months Russia has imposed unilateral and punitive sanctions against Georgia. It has launched a campaign of disinformation and ethnic targeting. All of us can only ask what the real purpose of this policy is. We wonder whether Russia's purpose is simply to use these conflicts for other reasons – to use Georgia as a pawn in a larger game. We are not a pawn. And this is not a Georgian problem.

The issue is the policy of the state of the Russian Federation – and that policy has global consequences. And this is a matter of vital importance for the European Union. And we are sure that all our friends in the European Union understand this. All of our friends who have developed and thrived, due to value-based societies.

Once again, let me reiterate our readiness to engage in a dialogue with the Russian Federation – in a constructive, genuine, well-intentioned and positive manner.

But let us not forget that the irresponsible and cynical promotion of separatism by greater regional powers has led to blood baths and disasters. We do not need this. Europe does not need this. The world does not need this.

Thank you very much.